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We construct an overlapping generations model for the small open economy which 
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It is a well documented fact that the western world is ageing rapidly. Since the postwar
period, the ageing process can be attributed both to increased longevity and reduced fertility
(Lee, 2003). For example, in the Netherlands, life expectancy at birth rose from 71.5 years in
1950 to 78.5 years in 2000, whilst the annual (crude) birth rate fell from 2.3% to 1.3% of the
population. Because infant mortality stayed relatively constant during that period (at 0.8%
of the population), the increase in longevity must be attributed to reduced adult mortality.
Not surprisingly, the demographic change has led to a dramatic increase in the population
share of elderly people over that period—the old-age dependency ratio (measured as the ratio
of the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged 15-64) rose from 12.2% in 1950
to 20.1% in 2002. A similar demographic pattern can be observed for most OECD countries.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects on the economic growth perfor-
mance of a small open economy of substantial demographic shocks of the type and magnitude
mentioned above. We formulate a simple analytical growth model in which ﬁnitely-lived
agents accumulate both physical and human capital. Our analysis makes use of modelling in-
sights from two main bodies of literature. First, in order to allow for overlapping generations,
we employ the generalized Blanchard-Yaari model reported in our earlier paper (Heijdra and
Romp, 2005). In this model disconnected generations are born at each instant and individual
agents face a positive and age-dependent probability of death at each moment in time. By
making the mortality rate age-dependent, the model can be used to investigate changes in
adult mortality.
The second building block of our analysis concerns the engine of growth. Following Lucas
(1988), we assume that the purposeful accumulation of human capital forms the core mech-
anism leading to economic growth. More speciﬁcally, like Bils and Klenow (2000), Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2000), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), and Boucekkine et al. (2002), we
assume that individual agents accumulate human capital by engaging in full-time educational
activities at the start of life. The start-up education period is chosen optimally and the human
capital production function may include an intergenerational external eﬀect of the “shoulders
of giants” variety, as proposed by Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
As we motivate in more detail in the paper, we extend the existing literature in the follow-
ing directions. First, we generalize Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) by incorporating a realistic
(rather than a Blanchard) demographic structure, allowing for non-zero intergenerational
spillovers, and by fully characterizing the transitional dynamics. Second, we generalize the
analysis by de la Croix and Licandro (1999) and Boucekkine et al. (2002) by incorporating
both human and physical capital, by including a concave (rather than linear) felicity func-
tion, and by allowing the intergenerational spillover to diﬀer from unity. Third, we generalize
the model of Bils and Klenow (2000) by recognising fully-insured-against lifetime uncertainty
(rather than a ﬁxed planning horizon), by assuming a more realistic human capital produc-
2tion function, and by characterizing the transitional dynamics. Finally, we generalize all these
papers by including an educational subsidy and a labour income tax.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model
and demonstrate its main properties. A unique solution for the optimal schooling period is
derived which depends on the ﬁscal parameters and on the mortality process. The mortality
process, in combination with the birth rate, also determines a unique path for the population
growth rate. For a given initial level of per capita human capital, the model implies a unique
time path for all macroeconomic variables. Depending on the strength of the intergenerational
external eﬀect, the model either displays exogenous growth (ultimate convergence to constant
per capita variables) or endogenous growth (convergence to a constant growth rate).
In Section 3 we study the determinants of the optimal schooling decision in detail. An
increase in the educational subsidy or the labour income tax leads to an increase in the length
of the educational period. Similarly, a reduction in adult mortality also prompts agents to
increase the schooling period. In contrast, a reduction in child mortality and a baby bust
both leave the optimal schooling period unchanged.
In Section 4 we investigate the eﬀects of changes in the birth rate and adult mortality
on the population growth rate, both at impact, during transition, and in the long run. A
reduction in the birth rate reduces the steady-state population growth rate, whilst an increase
in longevity (due to reduced adult mortality) increases this rate because average mortality
falls. We estimate the Gompertz-Makeham mortality process, using data for the Dutch co-
hort born in 1920, and use it to illustrate the rather complicated (cyclical) adjustment path
resulting from once-oﬀ demographic changes. Especially for the embodied mortality shock,
convergence toward the new steady state is extremely slow. Indeed, due to the vintage na-
ture of the population, more than 150 years pass until the new demographic steady state is
reached.
Section 5 deals with the exogenous growth model, which, on the basis of the empirical
evidence, we consider to be the most relevant one. In it, we study the (impact, transitional,
and long-run) eﬀects of ﬁscal and demographic changes on per capita human capital and the
other macroeconomic variables. A positive ﬁscal impulse leads to an increase in the per capita
stock of human capital but leaves the steady-state growth rate of the macro-variables in level
terms unchanged (and equal to the steady-state population growth rate). Furthermore, whilst
a reduction in the birth rate and an increase in longevity (due to reduced adult mortality)
both increase the steady-state per capita human capital stock, the growth eﬀects on level
variables are opposite in sign. Again, for both ﬁscal and demographic shocks, the transitional
adjustment is rather slow.
In Section 6 of the paper we brieﬂy discuss the endogenous growth version of the model.
Though this knife-edge case has been studied extensively in the theoretical literature, it is
based on an unrealistically strong intergenerational external eﬀect in human capital creation
for which very little empirical backing exists. The positive ﬁscal impulse boosts the steady-
3state growth rate in per capita human capital due to the scale eﬀect in the growth process. The
growth eﬀects of demographic changes are theoretically ambiguous. For a realistic model cal-
ibration, however, the asymptotic growth rate is decreasing in the birth rate and in longevity
(as measured by life expectancy at birth).
Finally, in Section 7 we present some concluding thoughts and give some suggestions for





From the perspective of time t, a household born at time v (v ≤ t) has the following (remain-




U [¯ c(v,τ)]e−[θ(τ−t)+M(τ−v)]dτ, (1)
where U [ ] is the felicity function, ¯ c(v,τ) is consumption, θ is the constant pure rate of time
preference (θ > 0), and e−M(τ−v) is the probability that the household is still alive at time
τ.1 The cumulative mortality rate, M (τ − v), is deﬁned as:




where m(α) is the instantaneous mortality rate of a household of age α. As was pointed out
by Yaari (1965), future felicity is discounted not only because of pure time preference (as
θ > 0) but also because of life-time uncertainty (as M (τ − v) > 0 for τ > v). The felicity
function is iso-elastic:







for σ  = 1
ln¯ c(v,τ) for σ = 1
, (3)
where σ is the constant intertemporal substitution elasticity (σ ≥ 0).
The household budget identity is given by:
˙ ¯ a(v,τ) = [r + m(τ − v)]¯ a(v,τ) + ¯ w(v,τ) − ¯ g (v,τ) − ¯ c(v,τ), (4)
1The appearance of the term e
M(t−v) in (1) (and also in equations (9)-(10) below) is a consequence of
the fact that the distribution of expected remaining lifetimes is not memoryless in general. Blanchard (1985)
uses the memoryless exponential distribution for which M (α) = µ0α (where µ0 is a constant) and thus
M (t − v) − M (τ − v) = −M (τ − t). Equation (1) can then be written in a more familiar format as Λ(v,t) ≡
  ∞
t U [¯ c(v,τ)]e
−(θ+ 0)(τ−t)dτ.
4where ¯ a(v,τ) is real ﬁnancial wealth, r is the exogenously given (constant) world interest rate,
¯ w(v,τ) is wage income, and ¯ g (v,τ) is total tax payments (see below). As usual, a dot above
a variable denotes that variable’s time rate of change, e.g. ˙ ¯ a(v,τ) ≡ d¯ a(v,τ)/dτ. Following
Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), we postulate the existence of a perfectly competitive
life insurance sector which oﬀers actuarially fair annuity contracts to the households. Since
household age is directly observable, the annuity rate of interest faced by a household of age
τ − v is equal to the sum of the world interest rate and the instantaneous mortality rate
of that household. In order to avoid having to deal with a taxonomy of diﬀerent cases, we
restrict attention in the remainder of this paper to the case of a nation populated by patient
agents, i.e. r > θ. Financial wealth can be held in the form of claims on domestic capital
(¯ v (v,τ)), domestic government bonds (¯ d(v,τ)), or foreign bonds ( ¯ f (v,τ)).
¯ a(v,τ) ≡ ¯ v (v,τ) + ¯ d(v,τ) + ¯ f (v,τ). (5)
These assets are perfect substitutes in the households’ portfolios and thus attract the same
rate of return.
The household engages in full time schooling during the early stages of life and works full
time thereafter. The production function for human capital is given by:2
¯ h(v,τ) =
 
0 for v ≤ τ ≤ v + s(v)
AHh(v)
φ s(v) for τ > v + s(v)
, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, (6)
where ¯ h(v,τ) is the human capital of the agent upon completion of the schooling period, AH
is an exogenous productivity index, h(v) is per capita human capital at time v (see below),
and s(v) is the length of the schooling period chosen by an agent born at time v. Special
cases of equation (6) are used by de la Croix and Licandro (1999, p. 257) and Boucekkine
et al. (2002, p. 347) who set φ = 1, and by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000, pp. 5, 10) who set
φ = 0.
Available human capital is rented out to competitive producers so that wage income,
¯ w(v,τ), can be written as:
¯ w(v,τ) = w(τ)¯ h(v,τ), (7)
2This formulation was ﬁrst proposed in the context of Diamond-Samuelson style overlapping models by
Azariadis and Drazen (1990, p. 510) and Tamura (1991, p. 524). Abstracting from their work experience
term and using our notation, Bils and Klenow (2000, p. 1161) model the human capital production function
as follows:
¯ h(v,t) = ¯ h(v − ¯ u,t)
φ e
ζ(s), for t − v > s, (6
′)
where ¯ u is interpreted as the age of the teachers (assumed to be ﬁxed), and ζ (s) captures the productivity
eﬀect of schooling (ζ
′ (s) > 0). Clearly, for ζ (s) ≡ lns the second term on the right-hand side of (6
′) is equal
to s. In our view, equation (6
′) does not adequately capture the notion of an intergenerational externality as
the link is only operative between generations v and v − ¯ u, who are locked in a tango through time. In (6)
the economy-wide stock of per capita human capital determines the inital condition facing newborns. Hence,
every agent alive at time v exerts an external eﬀect on these newborns.
5where w(τ) is the market-determined rental rate of human capital (see below).
The tax system takes the following form. First, throughout its entire life, the household
pays a lumpsum tax. Second, during its educational phase, the household receives a study
grant from the government. Third, during its working life, the household faces a labour
income tax on its wage earnings. The tax system is thus given by:
¯ g (v,τ) =
 
[z (τ) − ρ]w(τ)AHh(v)
φ for v ≤ τ ≤ v + s(v)
[z (τ) + tLs(v)]w(τ)AHh(v)
φ for τ > v + s(v)
, (8)
where ρ is the educational subsidy rate (ρ > 0), tL is the marginal labour income tax rate (0 ≤
tL < 1), and z (τ) represents the lumpsum part of the tax. All tax instruments are indexed to
the value of marginal schooling productivity to the vintage-v household (i.e. AHh(v)
φ). This
is done to ensure that the tax system continues to play a nontrivial role even in the presence
of ongoing economic growth.3
From the perspective of the planning date t, the household chooses remaining time in
school (v+s(v)−t), and sequences for ¯ c(v,τ) and ¯ a(v,τ) (for τ ∈ [t,∞)) in order to maximize
Λ(v,t) subject to (4)-(8), a non-negativity constraint v + s(v) ≥ t,4 and a transversality
condition. By using this transversality condition as well as equations (4)-(8), the lifetime




¯ c(v,τ)e−[r(τ−t)+M(τ−v)]dτ = ¯ a(v,t) + li(v,t), (9)
where we have used the fact that generations are born without ﬁnancial assets (i.e. ¯ a(v,v) =


















According to (9), the present value of consumption expenditure (left-hand side) must equal
total lifetime resources (right-hand side). In the presence of actuarially fair annuity contracts,
the annuity rate of interest, r + m(τ − v), is used for discounting purposes in (9)-(10).
The following two-stage solution approach can now be used. In the ﬁrst step, the household
chooses s(v) in order to maximize lifetime wage income, li(v,t). This pushes the lifetime
budget constraint out as far as possible and ﬁxes the right-hand side of (9). In the second
step, the household chooses the optimal sequence for consumption in order to maximize Λ(v,t)
subject to (9).
3Alternatively, current gross per capita labour income, w(τ)h(τ), could have been used for indexing pur-
poses, but this makes the model intractable.
4Older households have already completed the educational phase (t − v > s(v)) and only choose paths for
consumption and ﬁnancial assets. Labour market entry is thus assumed to be an absorbing state.
6Schooling period By using equation (10), the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal school-









w(v + s∗ (v))e−[rs∗(v)+M(s∗(v))]. (11)










e−[λα+M(α)]dα, (for u ≥ 0), (13)
where α ≡ τ−v is the household’s age at time τ. For future reference, Proposition 1 establishes
some important properties of the ∆(u,λ) function.
Proposition 1 Let ∆(u,λ) be deﬁned as in (13) and assume that the mortality rate is non-
decreasing, i.e. m′ (α) ≥ 0 for all α ≥ 0. Then the following properties can be established for
∆(u,λ):






[α − u]e−[λα+M(α)]dα < 0;
(ii) non-increasing in household age,
∂∆(u,λ)
∂u
= (λ + m(u))∆(u,λ) − 1 ≤ 0;




(v) for m′ (α) > 0 and m′′ (α) ≥ 0, the inequality in (ii) is strict and lim
u→∞∆(u,λ) = 0.
Proof: see Heijdra and Romp (2005).
Equation (12) determines the age at which the vintage-v household completes its education.
With a constant mortality process, the optimal schooling period is independent of the house-
hold’s date of birth. Since the left-hand side of (12) is increasing in s∗ and (by Proposition
1(ii)) the right-hand side is non-increasing in s∗, it follows that the optimal schooling period
is positive and unique.5 In Section 3 below we study changes in the tax parameters and the
demographic structure which give rise to once-oﬀ changes in the optimal schooling period.
5Indeed, for the Blanchard case with a constant death rate, ∆(u,λ) = 1/(λ + µ0), and (12) simpliﬁes even
further to s(v) = ρ/(1 − tL) + 1/(r + µ0). Apart from the ﬁscal parameters, this is the expression found in
de la Croix and Licandro (1999, p. 258).
7Consumption By using (1) and (9), the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal consumption
can be written as ¯ c(v,τ) = eσ[r−θ](τ−v)/λu, where λu (> 0) is the Lagrange multiplier for the
lifetime budget constraint (9). Since r > θ, it follows that the household adopts an upward
sloping time proﬁle for its consumption provided the intertemporal substitution elasticity is




= σ [r − θ], (for τ ∈ [t,∞)). (14)
By using (14) in (9) the expression for the consumption level in the planning period is ob-
tained:
∆(u,r∗)¯ c(v,t) = ¯ a(v,t) + li(v,t), (15)
where r∗ ≡ r−σ [r − θ] can be interpreted as the eﬀective discount rate facing the household.
2.1.2 Demography
We allow for non-zero population growth by employing the analytical framework developed
by Buiter (1988) and extended to a non-constant mortality rate by Heijdra and Romp (2005).
We assume that the size of a newborn generation at time v is proportional to the current
population at that time, i.e. L(v,v) = bL(v), where b is the constant crude birth rate (b > 0),
and L(v) is the population size at time v. The size of cohort v at some later time τ is given
by:
L(v,τ) = L(v,v)e−M(τ−v) = bL(v)e−M(τ−v). (16)





















Equation (19) generalizes the corresponding expression found in Heijdra and Romp (2005) to
the case of a non-constant population growth rate, n(t). Equation (20) implicitly determines
n(t) for given demographic parameters (see also Section 4).6
6For an economy which has faced the same demographic environment (b(v) = b and M(t − v)) for a long
time, the population growth rate is constant (n(τ) = n) and equation (20) reduces to 1/b = ∆(0,n). This is
the expression reported in Heijdra and Romp (2005).
82.1.3 Per capita household plans
Per capita variables are calculated as the integral of the generation-speciﬁc values weighted






where l(v,t) and ¯ h(v,t) are given in, respectively, (19) and (6) above. In a similar fashion,
per capita consumption is given by c(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ c(v,t)dv, where l(v,t) is deﬁned in (19)
and ¯ c(v,t) is given by (15). By diﬀerentiating c(t) with respect to time and noting (14) we
obtain an expression for the “Euler equation” for per capita consumption:
˙ c(t) = b¯ c(t,t) + σ [r − θ]c(t) − n(t)c(t) −
  t
−∞
m(t − v)l(v,t)¯ c(v,t)dv, (22)
where we have used the fact that ˙ l(v,t)/l(v,t) ≡ −[n(t) + m(t − v)]. Per capita consump-
tion grows over time because new generations are born at each instant who start to consume
out of human wealth (ﬁrst term on the right-hand side) and because individual consump-
tion of existing generations grows (second term). The third term on the right-hand side
of (22) corrects for time-dependent population growth, whilst the fourth term corrects for
(age-dependent) mortality.
Turning to the wealth components, per capita ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁned as a(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ a(v,t)dv. By diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to time we obtain the
dynamic path of per capita ﬁnancial assets:
˙ a(t) = [r − n(t)]a(t) + w(t)h(t) − g (t) − c(t), (23)
where g(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ g(v,t)dv is per capita tax payments. In deriving (23) we have used
equation (4) and noted the fact that agents are born without ﬁnancial assets (¯ a(t,t) = 0).
Throughout this paper we assume that the interest rate net of population growth is positive,
i.e. r > n(t). As in the standard Blanchard model, annuity payments drop out of the
expression for per capita asset accumulation because they constitute transfers (via the life
insurance companies) from the deceased to agents who continue to enjoy life.
2.2 Firms
Perfectly competitive ﬁrms use physical and human capital to produce a homogeneous com-
modity that is traded internationally. The technology is represented by the following Cobb-
Douglas production function:
Y (t) = K (t)
ε [AY H (t)]
1−ε , 0 < ε < 1, (24)
9where Y (t) is output, AY is an exogenous index of labour-augmenting technological change,
K (t) is the aggregate stock of physical capital, and H (t) ≡ L(t)h(t) is the aggregate stock
of human capital. The cash ﬂow of the representative ﬁrm is given by:
Π(t) ≡ Y (t) − w(t)H (t) − I (t), (25)
where w(t) is the rental rate on human capital, and I (t) ≡ ˙ K (t)+δK (t) is gross investment,
with δ representing the constant depreciation rate. The (fundamental) stock market value
of the ﬁrm at time t is equal to the present value of cash ﬂows, using the interest rate for
discounting, i.e. V (t) ≡
  ∞
t Π(τ)er(t−τ)dτ. The ﬁrm chooses paths for I (τ), K (τ), H (τ),
and Y (τ) (for τ ∈ [t,∞)) in order to maximize V (t) subject to the capital accumulation
constraint, the production function (24) and the deﬁnition of cash ﬂows (25). Since there are
no adjustment costs on investment, the value of the ﬁrm equals the replacement value of the
capital stock, i.e. V (t) = K (t). In addition, the usual factor demand equations are obtained:
∂Y (t)
∂K (t)














For each factor of production, the marginal product is equated to the rental rate. Since the
ﬁxed world interest rate pins down the ratio between human and physical capital, it follows
from (27) that the wage rate is time-invariant, i.e. w(τ) = w,7 and that physical capital is







2.3 Other model elements
In the absence of government consumption, the government (ﬂow) budget identity in per
capita terms is given by:
˙ d(t) = [r − n(t)]d(t) − g (t), (29)
where d(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ d(v,t)dv is per capita government debt. The government solvency
condition is lim
τ→∞d(τ)er(t−τ)+N(t,τ) = 0, so that the intertemporal budget constraint of the





7With labour-augmenting technological change, λ ≡ ˙ AY /AY , the wage rate grows exponentially at rate λ







It follows from Proposition 1(i) that ∂s
∗/∂λ > 0, i.e. the schooling period increases with anticipated wage
growth. See also Bils and Klenow (2000, p. 1161) on this issue.
10To the extent that there is outstanding debt (positive left-hand side), it must be exactly
matched by the present value of current and future primary surpluses (positive right-hand
side), using the net interest rate (r − n(τ)) for discounting purposes.
By using the marginal productivity conditions (26)-(27) and noting the linear homogeneity
of the production function (24) and the constancy of factor prices, we ﬁnd that per capita
output can be written as follows:








where y (t) ≡ Y (t)/L(t) and k(t) ≡ K (t)/L(t) =
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ k(v,t)dv. In going from the
ﬁrst to the second line we have made use of (28). It follows from the deﬁnition of gross
investment that the dynamic evolution of the per capita stock of capital is given by:
˙ k(t) = i(t) − [δ + n(t)]k(t), (32)
where i(t) ≡ I (t)/L(t) is per capita investment. Finally, the current account of the balance
of payment, representing the dynamic change in the per capita stock of net foreign assets,
f (t), takes the following form:
˙ f (t) = [r − n(t)]f (t) + y (t) − c(t) − i(t), (33)
where f(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t) ¯ f(v,t)dv.8
2.4 Model solution
The model is recursive and can be solved in three steps. First, for a given demography
and with constant tax parameters ρ and tL, equation (12) determines the optimal schooling
period for each household. Similarly, for a given birth rate, equation (20) can be solved for
the population growth rate, n(t). Next, conditional on the optimal value for s∗ and the path
for n(t), equation (21) can be solved for the equilibrium path of human capital, h(t). Finally,
the lumpsum tax z is used to balance the government’s intertemporal budget restriction (30),
after which the values for all remaining variables are fully determined.
In Section 3 the eﬀect on the optimal schooling period of both ﬁscal and demographic
shocks are studied. Next, we note that the path for human capital depends critically on the
8The dynamic expression for per capita assets is given in equation (23), where a(t) ≡ k (t) + d(t) + f (t)
(recall that V (t) = K (t)). Clearly, total per capita assets a(t) move smoothly over time but its constituting
components (k (t), f (t), and d(t)) need not. Hence, even in the absence of discrete adjustments in government
debt, the capital stock can jump as only k (t)+f (t) moves smoothly over time in that case. A discrete change
in k (t) would be engineered by means of an asset swap. Throughout the paper, however, the world interest
rate (r) is held constant so that (via (28)) the physical capital stock, k (t), will move smoothly because the
stock of human capital, h(t), moves smoothly. As a result, the model also gives rise to well-deﬁned current
account dynamics—see also Figures 4-6 below.
11magnitude of the intergenerational externality parameter, φ. For values of φ in the range
0 ≤ φ < 1, the model implies a unique steady-state level of per capita human capital, i.e. the
long-run growth rate in the economy is exogenous (and equal to the population growth rate).
This exogenous growth case is studied in Section 5.
For the knife-edge case with φ = 1, equation (21) gives rise to a unique steady-state
growth rate in per capita human capital, so that the long-run growth rate is endogenous.
This endogenous growth model is studied in Section 6 below.
3 Determinants of schooling
In this section we study the comparative static eﬀect on the optimal schooling period of
changes in the ﬁscal parameters and the demographic process. To keep things simple, only
step-wise changes are considered that occur at impact. The time at which the unanticipated
and permanent shock occurs is normalised at t = 0.
3.1 Fiscal shocks












2 (1 − ∂∆/∂s∗)
> 0, (35)
where the signs follow from the fact that ∂∆/∂s∗ ≤ 0 (see Proposition 1(ii)). Not surprisingly,
an increase in the educational subsidy leads to a reduction in the opportunity cost of schooling
and a longer optimal schooling period. Interestingly, provided the educational subsidy is
strictly positive, an increase in the marginal labour income tax also increases the optimal
schooling period. Because the educational subsidy is untaxed, the eﬀective subsidy aﬀecting
the schooling decision is ρ/(1 − tL), which is increasing in tL.
The eﬀect of ﬁscal shocks on the optimal schooling period have been illustrated in Figure
1(a) for the case with a Gompertz-Makeham (G-M) mortality process ﬁtted to actual mor-
tality data for the cohort born in the Netherlands in 1920. The instantaneous mortality rate
associated with the G-M process takes the following format:
m(u) = µ0 + µ1e 2u, (36)
where u is the household’s age, and the parameter estimates (and associated t-statistics) are
ˆ µ0 = 0.2437 × 10−2 (65.8), ˆ µ1 = 0.5520 × 10−4 (20.5), and ˆ µ2 = 0.0964 (138.2); see Heijdra
and Romp (2005). The estimated survival function ﬁts the data rather well. It predicts an






































(a) Fiscal Impulse (b) Reduced Adult Mortality
Figure 1: Schooling Period
In terms of Figure 1(a), the initial optimum, s∗
0, occurs at the intersection of the line
labelled ∆ + [ρ/(1 − tL)]0 and the 45◦ line. An increase in either ρ or tL leads to a parallel
upward shift in the former line to ∆ + [ρ/(1 − tL)]1 so that the new equilibrium is at s∗
1.
3.2 Demographic shocks
Two types of demographic shocks are considered in our analysis, namely a change in the birth
rate and a change in the mortality process. Clearly, in view of (12), the birth rate does not
aﬀect the optimal schooling period. The mortality process, however, does aﬀect the ∆(u,λ)
function and thus the optimal schooling decision. In order to study the eﬀects of changes in
the demographic process, we write the instantaneous mortality rate as m(α,ψ), where ψ is
a (vector of) parameter(s).9 In order to investigate the eﬀects of a change in ψ we make the
following assumptions.
Assumption 1 A mortality shock takes the following format:
(i) m(α,ψ) is non-negative, continuous, and non-decreasing in age, ∂m(α,ψ)/∂α ≥ 0;
(ii) m(α,ψ) is convex in age, ∂2m(α,ψ)/∂α2 ≥ 0;
(iii) m(α,ψ) is non-increasing in ψ for all ages, ∂m(α,ψ)/∂ψ ≤ 0;
(iv) the eﬀect of ψ on the mortality function is non-decreasing in age, ∂2m(α,ψ)/∂ψ∂α ≤ 0.
9In the Blanchard case, ψ = −µ0 (a scalar), but for the G-M process stated in equation (36) ψ =
−[µ0,µ1,µ2] (a vector).

































































(a) Mortality rate, m(u) = µ0 + µ1eµ2u (b) Surviving fraction, S(u) = e−M(u)
Figure 2: Reduced Adult Mortality
An example of a mortality shock satisfying all the requirements of Assumption 1 consists
of a decrease in µ1 or µ2 of the G-M mortality function. In terms of Figure 2(a), the shock
shifts the mortality function downward, with the reduction in mortality being increasing in
age. In panel (b) the function for the surviving fraction of the population shifts to the right.
The shock that we consider can thus be interpreted as a reduction in adult mortality. Of
course, in view of the terminology of Assumption 1, an increase in ψ leads to an increase in
the expected remaining lifetime for all ages.
The following results can now be proved.









































14By using equation (12), and noting the deﬁnition (13′), the comparative static eﬀect on





1 − ∂∆/∂s∗ > 0, (37)
where the sign follows from the fact that ∂∆/∂s∗ ≤ 0 (see Proposition 1(ii)) and ∂∆/∂ψ > 0
(see Proposition 2(iii)). An increase in longevity prompts agents to increase their human
capital investment at the beginning of life. In terms of Figure 1(b), the mortality shock
shifts the demographic discount function to the right, and leads to an increase in the optimal
schooling period from s∗
0 to s∗
1.
Bils and Klenow argue that a higher life expectancy (as captured in their model by an
increase in the exogenous planning horizon) leads to an increase in the optimal schooling
period “since it aﬀords a longer working period over which to reap the wage beneﬁts of
schooling” (2000, p. 1164). Similarly, de la Croix and Licandro (1999, p. 258) and Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2000, p. 11), using the Blanchard demography, show that a decrease in the
death probability leads to an increase in the expected planning horizon for all agents and
an increase in the optimal schooling period. Our discussion shows that these conclusions are
misleading in the presence of lifetime uncertainty and age-dependent mortality. In our model,
a decrease in child mortality increases expected remaining life time at birth but leaves the
optimal schooling period unchanged. In terms of Figure 1(b), reduced child mortality ﬂattens
the left-hand section of the line ∆0+ρ/(1 − tL) but the equilibrium solution stays at s∗
0.10 11
Of course, with the Blanchard demography one cannot distinguish between child mortality
and adult mortality because the death probability is age-independent.
4 Demographic Shocks and the Population Growth Rate
Demographic changes aﬀect the growth rate of the population, both at impact, during tran-
sition, and in the long run. Armed with Proposition 1 we can compute the long-run eﬀects
of changes in the birth rate and the mortality process. Indeed, since equation (20) reduces in
the steady state to b∆(0, ˆ n,ψ) = 1, it follows that ˆ n is an implicit function of b and ψ, the
10Boucekkine et al. also distinguish age-dependent mortality and argue that “an increase in life expectancy
increases the optimal length of schooling” (2000, pp. 352, 370). They thus fail to notice that the mechanism
producing this result runs via reduced old-age mortality, not via increased life expectancy in general.
11Bils and Klenow (2000, p. 1175) also report that their model implies an unrealistically high sensitivity of
the optimal schooling period with respect to life expectancy that is close to unity. In contrast, in the calibrated
version of our model, ds
∗/dR(0) = 0.06 which comes close to the empirical estimate mentioned by Bils and
Klenow (2000, p. 1175n27).











∂∆(0, ˆ n,ψ)/∂ˆ n
> 0, (39)
where a hat overstrike designates the steady-state value of the variable in question, i.e. ˆ n is the
steady-state growth rate of the population. The signs in (38)-(39) follow from Propositions
1(i) and 2(iii). Not surprisingly, an increase in the birth rate and an increase in longevity
both lead to an increase in the steady-state growth rate of the population.
To compute the transition path for the growth rate of the population we assume that
at time t = 0 both the mortality process and the birth rate change in a stepwise fashion.
The mortality shock is assumed to be embodied, i.e. it only aﬀects generations born from
time t = 0 onwards. Indeed, the mortality process for pre-shock cohorts (with a negative
generation index, v < 0) is described by M0(t−v) and m0(t−v), whereas post-shock cohorts
(with v ≥ 0) face the mortality process described by M1(t − v) and m1(t − v). In a similar
fashion, the pre-shock and post-shock birth rates are denoted by, respectively, b0 and b1. The
system is initially in a demographic steady state and the pre-shock population growth rate
is denoted by ˆ n0 (deﬁned implicitly by the condition 1 = b0∆0 (0, ˆ n0), where ∆0 (0, ˆ n0) is the
demographic discount function associated with the initial mortality process).
As a consequence of the demographic changes, the path for the population growth rate is








where N (v,t) ≡
  t
v n(τ)dτ (see also (18) above). It is shown in the Appendix that equation
(40) can be rewritten in the form of a linear Volterra equation of the second kind with a
convolution-type kernel for which eﬃcient numerical solution algorithms are available. In
Figure 3 we plot the transition path for n(t) for both types of demographic shocks. Panel
(a) depicts the path for a baby bust. There is an immediate downward jump at impact
(n(0) = ˆ n0 − b0 + b1) followed by gradual cyclical adjustment. Adjustment is rather fast
because the birth rate change applies to the entire (pre-shock and post-shock) population alike.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 depicts the adjustment path following a decrease in adult mortality.
Nothing happens at impact and the population growth rate only gradually rises to its long-run
steady-state value. Transition is much slower than for the baby bust because the ageing shock
is embodied, i.e. the shock only applies to post-shock generations and pre-shock generations
only die oﬀ gradually during the demographic transition.




























































(a) Baby bust (b) Reduced adult mortality
Figure 3: Population Growth Rate
5 Exogenous growth
In the previous section it was shown that both ﬁscal and demographic shocks lead to a change
in the optimal schooling period, s∗. In this section we study the resulting transitional and long-
run eﬀects on human capital formation for the exogenous growth case, i.e. we assume that the
intergenerational knowledge transfer incorporated in the human capital production function
(6) is either absent (φ = 0) or subject to diminishing returns (0 < φ < 1). This section
proceeds as follows. First, in Subsection 5.1 we analytically characterize the steady-state and
study its sensitivity with respect to ﬁscal and demographic shocks. Next, in Subsection 5.2 we
visualise the rather complicated transitional dynamics associated with the various shocks for
a plausibly parameterized model which incorporates the estimated G-M process introduced
above (see the discussion below equation (36)).
5.1 Long-run eﬀects
In the long-run equilibrium, equation (21) gives rise to the following expression for the steady-
state stock of per capita human capital, ˆ h:




Equation (41) clearly shows the various mechanisms aﬀecting ˆ h, namely (i) the birth rate, (ii)
the optimal schooling decision of agents, s∗, which itself depends on the ﬁscal and mortality
parameters (ρ,tL,ψ), (iii) the population growth rate, ˆ n, which depends on (b,ψ), and (iv)
the cumulative mortality factor, M(u,ψ), which depends on the mortality parameter ψ.
Pure schooling shock In order to facilitate the interpretation of our results, we ﬁrst study
the eﬀects of a change in the schooling period in isolation. By diﬀerentiating equation (41)
17with respect to s∗ and simplifying we obtain:
∂ˆ h1−φ
∂s∗ = AHbe−[ˆ ns∗+M(s∗,ψ)][∆(s∗, ˆ n) − s∗]
= AHbe−[ˆ ns∗+M(s∗,ψ)]
 





where we have used (12) to arrive at the second expression. In the absence of an educational
subsidy (ρ = 0), a pure schooling shock unambiguously leads to an increase in the per capita
stock of human capital. Indeed, since the interest rate exceeds the steady-state growth rate
of the population (r > ˆ n), it follows from Proposition 1(i) that ∆(s∗, ˆ n) > ∆(s∗,r) so that
∂ˆ h1−φ/∂s∗ > 0 in that case. With a non-zero educational subsidy, equation (42) shows that
the eﬀect on ˆ h of a pure schooling shock is no longer unambiguous because a suﬃciently high
eﬀective educational subsidy will render the term in square brackets negative even for the
case with r > ˆ n. Intuitively, in such a case the economy is “over-educated”, i.e. agents study
for too long a period and thus have too short a career as productive workers. Because in
actual economies r is much greater than ˆ n and educational subsidies are typically quite low,
we make the following assumption which rules out over-education and ensures that ∂ˆ h1−φ/∂s∗
is positive.
Assumption 2 The steady-state net interest rate r−ˆ n is suﬃciently positive to ensure that
∆(s∗, ˆ n) > ∆(s∗,r) +
ρ
1−tL.
Fiscal shock A ﬁscal shock, consisting of an increase in either ρ or tL, aﬀects the steady-
state per capita human capital stock according to:
∂ˆ h1−φ





∂ [ρ/(1 − tL)]
> 0, (43)
where the sign follows from (34)-(35) above. The ﬁscal shock leads to an increase in the
optimal schooling period which, in view of Assumption 2, leads to an increase in ˆ h.
Birth rate shock A change in the birth rate aﬀects steady-state per capita human capital
both directly and via its eﬀect on the steady-state population growth rate. By diﬀerentiating
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Ψ(s∗) < 0, (44)
where we have used (38) to arrive at the second expression and the sign follows from Lemma
A.1 in the Appendix. Intuitively, a higher birth rate leads to an upward shift in the steady-
state path of the human capital stock in level terms, but also induces an increase in the
population growth rate. The latter eﬀect dominates the former so that per capita human
capital declines in the steady state.
18Mortality shock The mortality change is by far the most complicated shock under con-
sideration because it aﬀects the schooling period, s∗, the population growth rate, ˆ n, and the












where the sign follows from (37), (42), and Lemma A.2 in the Appendix. The ﬁrst compos-
ite term on the right-hand side is straightforward: increased longevity boosts the optimal
schooling period which in turn increases per capita human capital in the steady state. The
second term on the right-hand side represents the joint eﬀect of increased longevity on the
integral appearing on the right-hand side of (41). An increase in ψ has two eﬀects on the dis-
counting factor of that integral. First, the population growth rate is increased (∂ˆ n/∂ψ > 0)
leading to heavier discounting and a lower value for the integral. Higher population growth
constitutes a higher drag on human capital as the cake must be shared over ever more peo-
ple. This eﬀect leads to a decrease in per capita human capital. Second, the cumulative
mortality factor is decreased for higher age levels (∂M (u,ψ)/∂ψ < 0) leading to reduced
discounting and a higher integral. Educated people live longer as a result of the shock and per
capita human capital increases as a result. Lemma A.2 in the Appendix shows that, under
our set of assumptions regarding mortality change, the ﬁrst eﬀect is dominated by the sec-
ond (∂Ξ(s∗,ψ)/∂ψ > 0) and, ceteris paribus the schooling period, human-capital deepening
occurs as a result of increased longevity.
Balanced growth Up to this point attention has been restricted to steady-state per capita
human capital. This focus is warranted because all remaining variables are uniquely related
to ˆ h. Indeed, it follows directly from, respectively, (28) and (31), that ˆ k and ˆ y are both pro-
portional to ˆ h. Furthermore, the steady-state versions of (22), (29), (32), and (33) determine
unique values for  i, ˆ d, ˆ f, and ˆ c as a function of ˆ h, ˆ n, and the parameters. Hence, in level terms
the steady-state growth rate for output, consumption, investment, physical capital, human
capital, ﬁnancial assets, net foreign assets, and debt is equal to the steady-state population
growth rate, ˆ n.
5.2 Transitional dynamics
In this subsection we compute and visualise the transitional eﬀects of ﬁscal and demographic
shocks using a plausibly calibrated version of the model.12 The world interest rate is r = 0.055,
the pure rate of time preference is θ = 0.03, the intertemporal substitution elasticity is σ = 1,
the capital depreciation rate is δ = 0.07, and the eﬃciency parameter for physical capital is
ε = 0.3.
12Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) restrict attention to the steady state. Boucekkine et al. (2002, pp. 363-365)
only show the adjustment path in the endogenous growth rate following a drop in the birth rate.
19The human capital externality parameter is set at φ = 0.3. We rationalize this choice as
follows. In a recent paper, de la Fuente and Dom´ enech (2006, p. 12) formulate an aggregate
production function of the form:
lnyi (t) = lnTFPi (t) + α1 lnki (t) + α′
2 lnsi (t), (46)
where i is the country index, TFPi is total factor productivity, ki is capital per worker, and
si measures education attainment, i.e. the average years of education of employed workers.
Since their data on educational attainment refers to the total (rather than the employed)
population, they postulate the relationship lnsi (t) = β1 ln ¯ si (t) − β2 lnPRi (t), where ¯ si
measures population average education attainment (i.e. average years of schooling in the
adult population), and PRi is the participation rate (i.e. the proportion of employed adults).
Substituting this expression into (46) they derive the equation to be estimated:
lnyi (t) = lnTFPi (t) + α1 lnki (t) + α2 ln ¯ si (t) + α3 lnPRi (t), (47)
where α2 ≡ α′
2β1 and α3 ≡ −α′
2β2. They present panel data estimates for the parameters,
using diﬀerent speciﬁcations for lnTFPi (t), and ﬁnd large and highly signiﬁcant values for
α2 ranging from 0.378 to 0.958 (de la Fuente and Dom´ enech, 2006, p. 14). They argue
on the basis of meta-estimation that the lower bound for the key parameter of interest,
α′
2, lies in the range of 0.752 to 0.844 for the ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions. They conclude that
“...investment in human capital is an important growth factor whose eﬀect on productivity
has been underestimated in previous studies because of poor data quality” (de la Fuente and
Dom´ enech, 2006, p. 28).
What does this say about our φ parameter? In the steady state our model implies the
following relationship:











. Ignoring the fact that in equa-
tion (48) the constant term itself depends negatively on s∗, we ﬁnd that ˆ α1 is an estimate for ε
and ˆ α′
2 is an estimate for (1 − ε)/(1 − φ). De la Fuente and Dom´ enech ﬁnd estimates for ˆ α1 in
the range 0.448 to 0.491, so that the implied estimate for φ is given by ˆ φ ≡
 
ˆ α′




which ranges from 0.266 to 0.397.13 Our chosen value of φ falls within this region.
On the demographic side, we interpret the estimated G-M demography as the truth and
choose the birth rate, b, such that ˆ n = 0.0134 (the average population growth rate during the
period 1920-1940). This yields a value of b = 0.0237 (which falls in between the observed birth
rates for 1920 (= 0.028) and 1940 (= 0.02)). The estimated G-M model yields an expected
13Of course, this is only a very tentative estimate for φ for at least two reasons. First, the data may not
represent observations for the steady state. Second, the procedure ignores the fact that α0 itself also depends
on s
∗. This may lead to an under-estimate for φ.
20remaining lifetime at birth of 65.5 years. We compute the implied wage rate from the factor
price frontier and ﬁnd w = 1.019. The initial lumpsum tax follows from the government
solvency condition for an initial debt level of ˆ d0 = −2.112 and ﬁscal parameters ρ = 4.915
and tL = 0.15. The implied value for the lumpsum tax is z0 = 0.2645. Finally, for the scaling
variables we use AH = AY = 1. The initial age at which agents leave school and enter the
labour market is s∗
0 = 21.82 years. The initial steady state has the following main features:
ˆ a0 = 7.8,   li0 = 647.2, ˆ h0 = 36.1, ˆ y0 = 52.6, ˆ c0 = 37.2,  i0 = 10.5, ˆ k0 = 126.2, and ˆ f0 = −116.2.
The output shares of consumption, investment, and net exports are, respectively, 0.71, 0.20,
and 0.09.
The economy is initially in a steady-state equilibrium, the stepwise shock occurs at time
t = 0, and we refer to pre-shock (v < 0) and post-shock agents (v ≥ 0). In the interest of
brevity, we focus the discussion on the transition path of per capita human capital. As is seen
readily from (28) and (31), the time paths for k(t) and y (t) are proportional to that of h(t).
The remaining variables of the model (such as d(t), i(t), f (t), li(t), a(t), and c(t)) feature
more complicated dynamic adjustment paths but are of less interest for the main purpose of
this paper. Where no confusion can arise we drop the “per capita” adjective in the intuitive
discussion of our results.
Fiscal shock In Figure 4 we illustrate the transitional dynamics associated with a ﬁscal
education impulse, consisting of a 20% increase in the educational subsidy, from ρ0 = 4.915 to
ρ1 = 5.897. There is no eﬀect on the demography so the population growth rate is unchanged
(n(t) = ˆ n0). The human capital of pre-shock workers is unaﬀected because labour market
entry is an absorbing state, i.e. workers cannot go back to school by assumption. Pre-shock
students, however, react to the improved ﬁscal incentives by extending their schooling period
from s∗
0 = 21.8 to s∗
1 = 22.9. As a result, in the time interval 0 ≤ t < s∗
1 − s∗
0 there are no
new labour market entrants and human capital declines sharply as a result of the mortality
process—see Figure 4(a). Labour market entry resumes for t ≥ s∗
1 − s∗
0 and the entrants
have a higher level of education, so human capital starts to rise as a result. During the
interval s∗
1 −s∗
0 ≤ t < s∗
1 entry consists entirely of pre-shock students, whereas for t ≥ s∗
1 only
post-shock cohorts enter the labour market. Since these cohorts choose the same schooling
period s∗
1, adjustment in human capital is monotonic. For t → ∞, the system reaches a new
steady-state which features a higher stock of human capital (see also (43) above).
Panels (b)-(f) of Figure 4 illustrate the adjustment paths of the other macroeconomic
variables. In panel (b) consumption falls at impact due to the once-oﬀ increase in the lumpsum
tax needed to ﬁnance the increase in the educational subsidy. During transition, however,
consumption increases monotonically as a result of the increase in lifetime income cause by
the increase in human capital. In panel (e) the path for government debt is illustrated. Debt
ﬂuctuates during transition because the government engages in tax smoothing with respect
to the lumpsum tax, z. The current account dynamics is illustrated in panel (f). At impact,
21the reduction in consumption and investment dominates the reduction in output, so that net
exports increase and the stock of net foreign assets rises sharply. During transition, however,
net foreign assets gradually fall during the ﬁrst two decades of adjustment after which they rise
to a permanently higher level. In a similar fashion, the path for total assets is non-monotonic
due to the population heterogeneity that exists during transition. Indeed, during transition
three broad cohort types coexist, namely pre-shock workers (who base their savings decisions
on the pre-shock schooling choice s∗
0), pre-shock students (who switched from s∗
0 to s∗
1 at time
t = 0 and changed their savings plans accordingly), and post-shock cohorts (who all choose
s∗
1 and, provided φ > 0, face changing initial conditions because human capital changes over
time).
Birth rate shock In Figure 5 we illustrate the transitional dynamics associated with a baby
bust, that is the birth rate drops once and for all by 10% from b0 = 0.0237 to b1 = 0.0213.
Nothing happens to the optimal schooling choice, but the population growth rate falls in a
non-monotonic fashion from ˆ n0 = 0.0134 to ˆ n1 = 0.0099 as is illustrated in Figure 3(a). The
sharp increase in human capital in Figure 5(a) is entirely attributable to the fast reduction
in n(t) during the early phase of transition. At time t = s∗
0, the population growth rate is
close to its new steady state and the slope of the per capita human capital stocks ﬂattens
out. This is because the ﬂow of labour market entrants is smaller than before as it consists
entirely of post-shock newborns. In the new steady state, per capita human capital increases
as a result of the baby bust (see also (44) above). For completeness sake, the paths for the
remaining macroeconomic variables are also illustrated in panels (b)-(f) of Figure 5.
Mortality shocks In Figure 6 we illustrate the transitional dynamics associated with an
adult mortality shock leading to increased longevity, that is the µ2-parameter of the G-M
process is reduced by 10% leading to an increase of the expected lifetime at birth from
R0 (0) = 65.45 to R1 (0) = 71.03. In the face of increased longevity, post-shock cohorts
choose a longer schooling period (s∗
1 = 22.2 instead of s∗
0 = 21.8). Furthermore, the shock
perturbs the demographic steady-state and causes a rather slow non-monotonic increase in
the population growth rate, from ˆ n0 = 0.0134 to ˆ n1 = 0.0149 as is illustrated in Figure 3(b).
The transition in human capital passes through the following phases. During the interval
0 ≤ t < s∗
0 nothing happens to human capital because only pre-shock students (facing an
unchanged mortality process) enter the labour market and the mortality process for pre-
shock workers has not changed. For s∗
0 ≤ t < s∗
1 there are no new labour market entrants at
all because post-shock students choose a schooling period s∗
1. Human capital declines sharply
because (a) pre-shock cohorts die oﬀ at the rate implied by the pre-shock mortality process,
and (b) the population growth rate increases. For t ≥ s∗
1 post-shock cohorts enter the labour
market. The closer the birth rate of such cohorts is to s∗
1, the worse are their initial conditions
in the human capital formation process. Indeed, the cohort born at time t = s∗
1 faces low
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(e) Government debt (rd(t)/ˆ y) (f) Foreign assets (rf(t)/ˆ y)
Figure 4: Aggregate Eﬀect of a Fiscal Impluse
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Figure 5: Aggregate Eﬀect of a Baby Bust
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(c) Investment (i(t)/ˆ y) (d) Assets (ra(t)/ˆ y)




















(e) Government debt (rd(t)/ˆ y) (f) Foreign assets (rf(t)/ˆ y)
Figure 6: Aggregate Eﬀect of Reduced Adult Mortality
25schooling productivity because h(s∗
1) is quite low. As is clear from Figure 6(a), human capital
increases in a non-monotonic fashion after t = s∗
1, where the bump after about 95 years is due
to the corresponding maximum in the population growth rate at that time—see Figure 3(b).
5.3 Discussion
The main ﬁndings of this section are as follows. Provided the intergenerational externality
parameter is below the knife-edge value of unity, the stock of per capita human capital settles
at a constant level in the long run. Balanced growth in consumption, investment, output,
employment, and human and physical capital is thus entirely due to population growth as in
the celebrated Solow-Swan model. Fiscal incentives, though causing permanent level eﬀects,
only produce temporary growth eﬀects. In contrast, demographic shocks change both levels
and the population growth rate in the long run. In particular, the baby bust reduces long-run
growth whilst increased longevity—due to reduced adult mortality—increases it. It is thus
an empirical issue whether ageing countries, experiencing the combined demographic shock
mentioned in the introduction, will ultimately converge to a lower or a higher long-run growth
rate. Since convergence is extremely slow, time series tests for the exogenous growth model
will be hard to conduct given the paucity of data.
6 Endogenous growth
Up to this point we have restricted attention to the case for which the intergenerational
knowledge externality is relatively weak (i.e. 0 ≤ φ < 1) and the system reaches a steady
state in terms of per capita levels. In this section we study the knife-edge case for which the
intergenerational knowledge transfer is very strong and subject to constant returns (φ = 1).
This case has been studied extensively in the literature; see among others Azariadis and
Drazen (1990) and Boucekkine et al. (2002).
6.1 Long-run eﬀects








e−[ˆ n(t−v)+M(t−v,ψ)]ˆ h(v)dv, (49)
where we have used (6) and (19) to arrive at the second expression. For convenience we state
the key properties of the steady-state growth path.
Proposition 3 The endogenous growth model (φ = 1) features the following properties:
26(i) there is a unique steady-state growth rate of per capita variables;
(ii) all per capita variables feature uniform convergence to their respective steady-state
growth path.
Proof: see Heijdra and Romp (2006).
Denoting the steady-state growth rate by ˆ γ, it follows that along the balanced growth
path we have ˆ h(v) = ˆ h(t)e−ˆ γ(t−v). By using this result in (49) and simplifying we obtain the




e−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)u+M(u,ψ)]du. (50)
Clearly, the model implies a scale eﬀect in the growth process, i.e. a productivity improvement
in the human capital production function gives rise to an increase in the steady-state growth
rate (∂ˆ γ/∂AH > 0). Equation (50) can also be used to compute the eﬀect on the asymptotic
growth rate of the ﬁscal and demographic shocks.
Pure schooling shock Just as in Subsection 5.1 above, the interpretation of our results is
facilitated by ﬁrst considering a pure schooling shock. By diﬀerentiating (50) with respect to
ˆ γ and s∗, and gathering terms we ﬁnd:
∂ˆ γ
∂s∗ =
e−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)s∗+M(s∗,ψ)][∆(s∗, ˆ γ + ˆ n) − s∗]
s∗   ∞
s∗ ue−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)u+M(u,ψ)]du
=
e−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)s∗+M(s∗,ψ)]
s∗   ∞
s∗ ue−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)u+M(u,ψ)]du
 





where we have used equation (12) to arrive at the ﬁnal expression. The sign of ∂ˆ γ/∂s∗ is
determined by the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (51). By appealing to
the endogenous-growth counterpart to Assumption 2 (with ˆ n replaced by ˆ n+ ˆ γ) we ﬁnd that
the steady-state growth rate increases as a result of the pure schooling shock.
Fiscal shock An increase in the educational subsidy or the labour income tax aﬀects the
steady-state growth rate via its positive eﬀect on the schooling period. Indeed, we deduce
from (34)-(35) and (51) that:
∂ˆ γ





∂ [ρ/(1 − tL)]
> 0. (52)
Birth rate shock The growth eﬀects of a birth rate change are computed most readily by
restating the shock in terms of the steady-state population growth rate, ˆ n, and noting the
monotonic relationship between ˆ n and b stated in (38) above. Indeed, by substituting the
steady-state version of (20) into (50) we ﬁnd an alternative implicit expression for ˆ γ:
  ∞
0
e−[ˆ nu+M(u,ψ)]du = AHs∗
  ∞
s∗
e−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)u+M(u,ψ)]du. (53)
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(a) Growth and the birth rate (b) Growth and life expectancy at birth
Figure 7: Growth and Demography
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Despite the fact that ∂ˆ n/∂b > 0, the growth eﬀect of a birth rate change is ambiguously
because the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (54) cannot be signed a priori.
Indeed, using the calibrated version of the model, we ﬁnd that the relationship between ˆ γ
and b is hump-shaped. As is illustrated in Figure 7(a), the growth rate rises with the birth
rate for low birth rates, but is decreasing for higher birth rates. For the calibrated model,
the maximum growth rate is attained at a birth rate of 1.25% per annum.
Mortality shock Just as in the exogenous growth model, increased longevity constitutes
by far the most complicated shock studied here. Indeed, as can be seen from equation (50)
above, a mortality shock aﬀects three distinct items featuring in the implicit expression for
the steady-state growth rate, ˆ γ, namely (a) the optimal schooling period, s∗, (b) the steady-
state growth rate of the population, ˆ n, and (c) the cumulative mortality factor, M (u,ψ). By
diﬀerentiating (50) with respect to ˆ γ and ψ (and recognising the dependence of s∗ and ˆ n on















∂ψ e−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)u+M(u,ψ)]du
  ∞
s∗ ue−[(ˆ γ+ˆ n)u+M(u,ψ)]du
R 0. (55)
The overall growth eﬀect of increased longevity is ambiguous. The ﬁrst composite term on
the right-hand side of (55) represents the schooling eﬀect, which is positive (see (37) and
(51)). The third term on the right-hand side represents the cumulative mortality eﬀect and
is also positive (given Proposition 2(i)). The ambiguity thus arises because the second term
28on the right-hand side exerts a negative inﬂuence on growth, i.e. increased longevity boosts
the steady-state population growth rate (see (39) above) which in turn slows down growth.
In Figure 7(b) we use the calibrated version of the model to plot the relationship between
the steady-state growth rate and a measure of longevity, namely life expectancy at birth,
R(0,ψ) ≡ ∆(0,0,ψ). Except for very low values of R(0,ψ), there is negative relationship
between long-term growth and longevity.
6.2 Transitional dynamics
In this subsection we visualise the transitional eﬀects of ﬁscal and demographic shocks in
the endogenous growth model. For reasons of space we ignore the adjustment paths for the
remaining macroeconomic variables and restrict attention to the growth rate of per capita
human wealth, γ (t) ≡ ˙ h(t)/h(t). Except for φ and AH, we use the same calibration values
as before (see Subsection 5.2). Because the model contains a scale eﬀect, we set AH = 0.13
and obtain a realistic steady-state growth rate, ˆ γ0 = 1.096%. The discussion here can be
quite brief because, following a shock, the transition proceeds along the same phases as in
the exogenous growth model.
Fiscal shock Figure 8(a) illustrates the path for γ (t) following a 20% increase in the
educational subsidy. For 0 ≤ t < s∗
1 − s∗
0 there are no new labour market entrants and the
growth rate collapses. Then, for s∗
1 − s∗
0 ≤ t < s∗
1 pre-shock students enter the labour market
and the growth rate jumps above its initial steady-state level. Finally, for t ≥ s∗
1 the growth
rate converges in a non-monotonic fashion to its long-run value, i.e. lim
t→∞
γ(t) = ˆ γ1 = 1.111%,
where ˆ γ1 exceeds the initial steady-state growth rate ˆ γ0 (see equation (52) above).
Birth rate shock In Figure 8(b) the transitional eﬀects of a baby bust are illustrated.
There is no eﬀect on the optimal schooling period but the population growth rate falls from
ˆ n0 to ˆ n1—see Figure 3(a). Growth jumps sharply due to the fast reduction in n(t) that occurs
at impact and immediately hereafter. Intuitively, pre-shock students enter the labour market
but their human capital is spread out over fewer people than before the shock so that growth
in per capita terms increases sharply. About twenty-two years after the shock, n(t) ≈ ˆ n1 and
there is a sharp decline in growth. This is because the post-shock students start to enter the
labour market. Despite the fact that they have higher human capital than existing workers,
as a group they are not large enough to maintain the previous growth in per capita human
capital. Thereafter, the growth rate converges in a non-monotonic fashion to its long-run
level ˆ γ1 = 1.193%, which is higher than the initial steady-state growth rate, i.e. ˆ γ1 > ˆ γ0.
Given our calibration, the economy lies to the right of the peak in the curve for ˆ γ in Figure
7(a) so that a baby bust increases long-run growth.
29Mortality shock In Figure 8(c) the eﬀect on the growth rate of increased longevity of
generations born after time t = 0 is illustrated. Just as for the exogenous growth model,
nothing happens to growth for the period 0 ≤ t < s∗
0 because only pre-shock agents enter
the labour market and the same type of agents die oﬀ. For s∗
0 ≤ t < s∗
1 there are no new
labour market entrants and the growth rate collapses. At time t = s∗
1 the oldest of the
post-shock cohorts enter the labour market and as a result growth is boosted again. For
t > s∗
1, the growth rate converges non-monotonically towards the new steady-state growth
rate ˆ γ1 = 1.088% < ˆ γ0. In terms of Figure 7(b), the calibration places the economy on the
downward sloping segment of the ˆ γ curve so increased longevity reduces the long-run growth
rate.
6.3 Discussion
The main ﬁndings of this section are as follows. For the calibrated model, the long-run growth
rate in per capita human capital increases as a result of a positive ﬁscal impulse or a fall in the
birth rate. Increased longevity, however, reduces this long-run growth rate. The transition
path in the growth rate is cyclical and rather complex for all shocks considered, and the new
equilibrium is reached only very slowly.
7 Conclusion
We have studied how ﬁscal incentives and demographic shocks aﬀect the growth performance
of a small open economy populated by disconnected generations of ﬁnitely-lived agents facing
age-dependent mortality and constant factor prices. Our main ﬁndings have been summarized
in a number of propositions throughout the text and thus need not be restated here. Among
other things, the paper highlights the crucial role played by the strength of the intergener-
ational external eﬀect in the production of human capital. Also, the vintage nature of the
model gives rise to very slow and rather complicated dynamic adjustment. This feature of
the model may help explain why robust empirical results linking education and growth have
been so hard to come by.
In the near future we intend to extend the paper in the following direction. As was
mentioned in the introduction, many OECD countries have experienced an increase in the
old-age dependency ratio over the last half century. This has important implications for the
feasibility of existing pay-as-you-go pension schemes, a phenomenon that has been abstracted
from in this paper. In future work we plan to endogenize the agent’s labour force participation
decision in the presence of a stylized public pension system including realistic institutional
features such as the early retirement age and the mandatory retirement age (Gruber and
Wise, 1999). With this extended model we hope to contribute to the literature on pension
reform in an ageing society.






















































(a) Fiscal impulse (b) Baby bust (c) Reduced adult mortality
Figure 8: Per Capita Human Capital Growth
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1Appendix
In this brief appendix we derive some key results used in the paper. More detailed derivations
are presented in Heijdra and Romp (2006).
Population growth and demography
The transition path for n(t) is determined implicitly by equation (40) in the text. By mul-









where we deﬁne N(t) ≡ N(0,t) for notational convenience. Since N(v) = ˆ n0v for v < 0 we
ﬁnd that:
eN(t) = b0eˆ n0t
  0
−∞















where we incorporate a change of variables (from the cohort domain to the age domain) in
going from the ﬁrst to the second line, and use the deﬁnition of ∆0(t, ˆ n0) in going from the
second to the third line.
Since the long-run population growth rate equals ˆ n1, it follows that (A.3) can be rewritten
in a stationary format by multiplying both sides of the expression by eˆ n1t. We obtain:
ξ(t) = χ(t) +
  t
0
K(t − v)ξ(v)dv, (A.4)
where ξ(t) ≡ eN(t)−ˆ n1t, χ(t) ≡ b0e−M0(t)−ˆ n1t∆0(t, ˆ n1), and K(t − v) ≡ b1e−M1(t−v)−ˆ n1(t−v).
Equation (A.4) is a so-called renewal equation, i.e. a linear Volterra equation of the second
kind with a convolution type kernel—see inter alia Linz (1985, p. 14) and Bellman and
Cooke (1963, ch. 7). By using standard numerical methods to solve this family of integral
equations we obtain a path for ξ(t) from which the path for n(t) can be derived by noting
that n(t) ≡ ˜ ξ (t)−ˆ n1, where ˜ ξ (t) ≡ dlnξ (t)/dt can be computed easily with the aid of ﬁnite
diﬀerence methods. It remains to determine the initial growth rate, n(0). By diﬀerentiating
(A.2) with respect to time and evaluating the result for t = 0 we ﬁnd that n(0) = ˆ n0−b0+b1.
In deriving this result we make use of the fact that M0 (0) = M1 (0) = 0, N (0) = 0, and
b0∆0 (0, ˆ n0) = 1.
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with ˆ n > 0 and M(u,ψ) as deﬁned in equation (2′). The following results can be established:
(i) Ψ(s) ≤ 0 for all s ≥ 0,
(ii) Ψ(0) = 0,
(iii) lim
s→∞Ψ(s) = 0.
Proof. Results (ii) and (iii) follow directly from the deﬁnition of Ψ(s). Diﬀerentiation with





s   ∞
0 e−[ˆ nu+M(u,ψ)]du
−




which is continuous in s and has only one root. The second derivative is positive in this
unique stationary point, so it is a global minimum. Together with (ii) and (iii) this implies
result (i). ¤







































By substituting (A.7) into (A.6) we ﬁnd that Ξψ(0,ψ) = 0. The stationary points of Ξψ(s,ψ)












33From Proposition 2 we know that
∂M(s,ψ)
∂ψ is non-positive, non-increasing and concave in s.
This implies together with
∂Ξψ(0,ψ)
∂s = 0 that
∂Ξψ(s,ψ)
∂s has at most two roots (one at s = 0) or
is 0 everywhere (if
∂Ξψ(0,ψ)
∂s = 0 on the interval [0,s∗], 0 ≤ s∗ ≪ ∞, then lim
s→∞Ξψ(s,ψ) = 0
does not hold). If
∂Ξψ(s,ψ)
∂s = 0 for all s ≥ 0, then Ξψ(s,ψ) = 0 for all s ≥ 0. This last
situation only occurs if
∂M(s,ψ)





∂u∂ψ < 0 for some s ≥ 0, then Ξψ(s,ψ) has exactly two stationary points for a given
ψ, one at s = 0 and one at s = s∗ > 0. Concavity of
∂M(s,ψ)
∂ψ implies that the stationary
point at s = s∗ is a maximum. Since
∂Ξ(s,ψ)
∂ψ goes to 0 as s → ∞ and is continuous,
∂Ξ(s,ψ)
∂ψ
must be positive for all s > 0, otherwise there would be a minimum somewhere at s > s∗.
This completes the proof. ¤
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